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Abstract
Traders using the electronic limit order book in the foreign exchange market can watch the posted
price and depth of the best quotes change over the day. The authors use a structural error-
correction model to examine the dynamics of the relationship between the best bid price, the best
ask price, and their associated depths. They incorporate measures of the market depth behind the
best quotes as regressors. They report four main ﬁndings. First, best prices and their associated
depths are contemporaneously related to each other. More speciﬁcally, an increase in the ask (bid)
price is associated with a drop (rise) in the ask (bid) depth. This suggests that sell traders avoid the
adverse-selection risk of selling in a rising market. Second, when the spread—the error-correction
term—widens, the bid price rises and the ask price drops, returning the spread to its long-term
equilibrium value. Further, the best depth on both sides of the market drops, due to increased
market uncertainty. Third, the lagged best depth impacts the price discovery on both sides of the
market, with the effect being strongest on the same side of the market. Fourth, changes in the
depth behind the best quotes impact both the best prices and quantities, even though those
changes are unobservable to market participants.
JEL classiﬁcation: C3, D8, F31
Bank classiﬁcation: Exchange rates; Financial markets
Résumé
Les cambistes qui ont accès à un carnet électronique d’ordres à cours limité peuvent observer les
variations intrajournalières des prix et de la profondeur afﬁchés aux meilleures limites. Les
auteurs ont recours à un modèle à correction d’erreurs structurel pour étudier la dynamique de la
relation entre le cours acheteur le plus élevé, le cours vendeur le plus bas et la profondeur associée
à chacun. Ils incluent parmi les variables de régression des mesures de la profondeur totale du
marché aux meilleures limites. Quatre grandes conclusions se dégagent de l’étude. Premièrement,
il existe une relation contemporaine entre les meilleures offres et leur profondeur : une hausse du
cours vendeur (acheteur) s’accompagne d’une baisse (augmentation) de la profondeur
correspondante. Ce résultat donne à penser que les placeurs d’ordres de vente souhaitent éviter le
risque d’antisélection lié à une vente sur un marché haussier. Deuxièmement, lorsque l’écart
acheteur-vendeur — le terme de correction d’erreurs — se creuse, le cours acheteur s’accroît et le
cours vendeur diminue, de sorte que l’écart retourne à sa valeur d’équilibre de long terme. En
outre, la profondeur effective aux meilleures limites recule des deux côtés du carnet en raison de
l’accentuation de l’incertitude sur le marché. Troisièmement, les valeurs passées de cettevi
profondeur inﬂuent sur le processus de découverte des prix tant chez les acheteurs que chez les
vendeurs, mais l’effet est plus marqué du même côté du carnet. Quatrièmement, les variations de
la profondeur totale aux meilleures limites ont une incidence à la fois sur les meilleures offres et
sur les quantités disponibles même si elles ne peuvent être observées par les acteurs du marché.
Classiﬁcation JEL : C3, D8, F31
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Taux de change; Marchés ﬁnanciers  1 
1.  Introduction 
In a limit order market, the market depth at each price determines the cost of trading. A steeper 
price schedule means that the cost of trading for any given order is higher. Despite there being 
two dimensions to the price schedule, most researchers focus on the price side, studying how 
prices react to changing market conditions (i.e., the price-discovery process).  This paper 
empirically examines the dynamics of both prices and depth for the best quotes in a limit order 
market.  Understanding which factors influence both of these characteristics for best quotes is 
important, because the best quotes are, by definition, the ones that are the next to be executed in 
the market.  Since these quotes represent the current marginal value that the market is assigning 
to the asset, the best prices are the focus of most existing studies.  Nevertheless, the actual 
marginal cost of trading is determined by both the price and the depth. 
  
This paper extends the existing literature by modelling the best prices and the market 
depth jointly by using the structural error-correction model (ECM) proposed by Kim, Ogaki, and 
Young (2003).  We model the changes in the best bid and ask prices and their associated depth in 
an electronic limit order market. In particular, we recognize that traders choose both price and 
quantity in placing a limit order. Thus, in aggregate, changes in price and depth can be 
contemporaneously related to each other. At the same time, past changes in price and depth on 
both sides of the market could also convey information and impact the current prices and depths. 
Therefore, we model both the contemporaneous and time-series relationships of best bid prices, 
best ask prices, and their associated depths in the structural ECM. Further, the model enables us 
to examine how prices and depth react to past changes in the price/depth on both the bid and ask 
sides of the market. We can therefore examine whether the information from the two sides of the 
market has an asymmetric impact on prices and depth. In addition, the model explicitly accounts 
for the cointegration between the best bid price and best ask price by incorporating the best bid-
ask spread as the error-correction term. Thus, the system of equations allows us to examine how 
the prices/depth on each side of the market react to a shock in the  equilibrium spread, and 
whether there is any asymmetry in the speed of adjustments. The model also includes measures 
of the market depth behind the best quotes, allowing us to examine whether such changes in the 
price schedule contain information relevant for changes in price and depth.    2 
The most similar empirical studies to this work are Hasbrouck (1991), Dufour and Engle 
(2000), Engle and Patton (2004), and Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001).  We extend Hasbrouck 
(1991) and Dufour and Engle (2000) in several ways: as in most existing studies, they focus on 
how the quoted midpoint price changes over time, and therefore they do not consider differences 
in how the prices develop to buy or sell the asset. We model both the current best bid and best 
ask prices from limit orders, and consider the corresponding depth.  We model both sides of the 
market because i t  has been demonstrated that markets react differently to bid and ask orders 
(e.g., Chan and Lakonishok 1993, 1995; Saar 2001).  We extend Engle and Patton (2004), who 
model both  the  ask and bid price dynamics of  equities in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), in two  ways: first, our model is  structural, and  so we are able to examine  the 
contemporaneous relationships between the endogenous variables—the  best prices and their 
associated depths. Second, we model  the best bid and ask depths on both sides of the market. 
Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) were the first to study the price and quantity choices of 
dealers on both sides of the market. Our analysis extends theirs by allowing lagged information 
to impact the price and depth dynamics. Our model also explicitly models the cointegration 
between the bid and ask prices.  
 
For our analysis, we use data from the electronic order book for the Deutsche Mark/U.S. 
dollar currency pair from the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system. This complements 
the existing  microstructure work using equity markets. The Reuters D2000-2 system is a limit 
order book, so it  is not subject to the  unknown  impact on the price schedule of a specialist 
standing ready to buy and sell unknown quantities at different prices. Our study contributes to 
the literature by being the first to model both price and depth dynamics in the limit order book in 
the foreign exchange (FX) market; 85 per cent of FX interdealer trades go through the limit order 
book, and the Reuters D2000-2 is the only data set to give complete information
1 on  it in the 
most liquid currency. Our modelling of the best price and the associated depth is directly related 
to the structure of the market. Only  the best bid and ask prices, along with their depths, are 
shown on the Reuters D2000-2 system, so the depth of orders behind the best prices is not known 
to market participants. Thus, by incorporating measures related to the depth of orders behind the 
                                                 
1 The Reuters D2000-2 data set is described in detail in section 3.   3 
best prices as explanatory variables, our model allows us to examine whether market participants 
have private information correlated with the behind best quotes. 
 
Our  main findings  can be  summarized as follows.  First,  there are significant 
contemporaneous relationships between the best prices and  their  associated  depths. More 
specifically, an increase in the concurrent best ask depth is associated with a significant drop in 
the  best  ask price.  The willingness of  more traders  to sell indicates that the currency is 
overpriced, so the best price adjusts downwards. Contrary to the ask side of the market, an 
increase in the concurrent best bid depth is associated with a significant rise in the best bid price. 
The willingness of more traders to buy indicates that the currency is underpriced, so the price 
rises. Alternatively, when the price is rising, there is less adverse-selection risk in buying at too 
high  a  price,  so traders place  larger orders.  For  the impact of changes in prices on the 
corresponding depth equations, we find that a higher current bid price or deeper current bid depth 
causes a negative change in the current best ask depth. The intuition is that higher bid prices or 
more buyers in the market are positive signals for the value of the currency, so sellers withdraw 
from the market to avoid being picked off.  
 
Second,  both best prices and depth react to  a  disturbance in the  error-correction 
component, the best bid-ask spread.  We find that, consistent with the findings in Engle and 
Patton (2004), a widening spread in one period leads to a subsequent decrease in the best ask 
price and an increase in the best bid price.  The speed of adjustment is roughly the same for both 
sides of the market. This suggests that the spread reverts to the long-run equilibrium value after 
shocks occur, increasing the spread. More interestingly, we find that a wider spread is associated 
with a negative change in depth on both sides of the market.  Traders appear to interpret a 
widening of spreads as an increase in  uncertainty, so they stop submitting orders or withdraw 
their existing orders.  
 
The information in the lagged depth at  the best and off-best prices affects  the price-
discovery process for both the bid and the ask sides of the market. More lagged depth at the best 
bid price leads to upward price movement, while more lagged depth at the best ask price leads to 
downward price movement.  Further, the effect on the same side of the market is stronger.   4 
Changes in the depth behind the best price impact changes in both ask and bid prices, although 
they are not observable to the market participants. A positive change in the bid depth more than 3 
pips away from the best price leads to a rise in the best ask price. The opposite holds for the best 
bid price. This suggests that market participants, who are major dealers in the foreign exchange 
market, have an information source (e.g., a private customer order base) that is correlated to the 
depth deeper down/up in  the order book. At the “closing” of the market,
2 best depths on both 
sides of the market rise, confirming the experimental asset market in Bloomfield, O’Hara, and 
Saar (2005). 
 
This paper  is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structural  error-correction 
model  used to  estimate the best bid and ask prices and their associated depths. Section  3 
describes the data set and defines the elements of the empirical models  that we estimate.   
Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analysis, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Model and Hypotheses 
2.1  Model 
The model we use has four unique features.  First, it is structural, so we are able to examine the 
contemporaneous relationship between best prices and their associated depths. Second, we model 
best bid prices, best ask prices, best bid depth, and best ask depth as a system, so we are able to 
more accurately capture any asymmetries in the dynamics between the bid and ask series.  Third, 
as in Engle and Patton (2004), we explicitly account for the cointegrating relationship between 
the best bid and ask price by incorporating the error-correction component, the bid-ask spread. 
Fourth,  we examine whether behind best depth  contains  information  that  impacts price and 
depth.  
 
The structural ECM that we use can be represented by the following equation:  
 
t t t t t E    Time X L C Y L A bspread d Y A + + + + + = - q ) ( ) ( 1 0 ,      (1) 
 
                                                 
2 The Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar market operates 24 hours a day, but quoting and trading activities drop to a low 
level after 16:00 GMT, as Figure 1 shows.    5 








t t d d p p Y D D D D =  is a vector consisting of changes in the best bid price,
bid
t p D , 
changes in the best ask price, 
ask
t p D , changes in the best bid quantity, 
bid
t d D , and changes in the 
best ask quantity,
ask
t d D , at time t. The concurrent relationships between best prices and best 
depths are represented by the  4 4· matrix 0 A , which is non-singular with ones along the principal 
diagonal. The lag effects of the best prices and best depths are represented by the matrix ) (L A . 
 
The l ag spread,  1 - t spread , is the difference between the best ask price and the best bid 
price. It is the error-correction component in equation (1), because the best bid and the best ask 
prices are prices on the same underlying asset and they are cointegrated.  We verify this by 
applying the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to the spread;
3 the null hypothesis that the spread is 
I(1) is rejected at the 1 per cent significance level.
4 The speed of adjustment towards the long-run 
equilibrium spread is represented by the  1 4·  vector, b.  
 
The set of exogenous variables that we consider, t X , consists of variables related to the 
depth at behind best prices in the order book; their effects are given by the coefficient matrix 
) (L C .  Two measures of depth behind the best prices are used. The first measure, the near depth, 
is the change in the aggregate depth 1 to 3 pips from the best price on each side of the market 
from time t-1 to t. This variable measures the changes in depth close to the best prices standing 
in the book. The second measure, the far depth, is the change in the aggregate depth more than 3 
pips from the best price on each side of the market from t-1 to t. This variable measures the 
changes in the depth further down/up the order book.  
 
The final aspect of the model is the time-of-day effects, time. Their effects are given by 
the coefficient matrix, q .  This term accommodates the distinct intraday seasonalities of quoting 
and trading in the foreign exchange market,  as Figure 1 shows.  The quoting activity of the 
Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate is  most active during two periods:  7:00  GMT– 
10:00 GMT (hereafter referred to as the London trading hours) and 12:00 GMT–16:00 GMT 
(hereafter referred to as the New York trading hours). We incorporate six hourly dummies, from 
                                                 
3 The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests include 10 lags of change in spread. 
4 Both the best ask depth and the best bid depth are I(0) variables. We account for the cointegration between only the 
best bid price and the best ask price, so there is only one cointegrating vector within the system.   6 
10:00 GMT to 16:00 GMT, to compare the price and depth dynamics of the trading day relative 
to those in the London trading hours. 
 
The vector, Et, contains the disturbance terms from equaiton (1). 
 
To estimate the model, we follow the instrumental v ariables method proposed in Kim, 
Ogaki, and Young (2003). The set of exogenous variables used in the model (the far depth and 
near depth) are used as instruments. For each equation, the near depth and the far depth on the 
same side of the market are excluded for identification purposes. Kavajecz and Odders-White 
(2001) similarly restrict price and quantity to respond only to information from the opposite side 
of the market, in order to identity the equations system. We w rite out the equations system 
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The equations above are estimated  using a  two-stage least-squares  method. White’s 
(1980) method is used in each equation to adjust for heteroscedasticity.  
 
2.2  Hypotheses 
2.2.1  Contemporaneous relationship between the best price and its associated depth 
When placing a limit order, a trader must specify both the price and quantity for the order. Thus, 
at the aggregate level, it would seem logical that changes in price and depth should be related to 
one another.  More specifically, we hypothesize that an increase in the depth on  the sell side 
should lead to a drop in both the bid and ask prices, since an increase in the number of traders 
willing to sell indicates that the currency is overvalued. Similarly, an increase in the depth on the 
buy side should lead to a rise in both the best bid and ask prices. 
 
Turning to the depth equations, an increase in the best prices should lead to a drop in the 
best ask depth, because traders want to avoid the adverse-selection risk of selling too low in case 
the price continues to rise. Similarly, an increase in the best prices should lead to an increase in 
the best bid depths, since there is less adverse-selection risk to buy when the price is increasing.    8 
2.2.2  Error-correction impact on prices and depths 
As Engle and Patton (2004) suggest, the best ask and bid prices should converge back towards 
their equilibrium values after a shock to the error-correction term, the lag spread. Thus, the best 
ask price should drop and the best bid price should rise after a widening of the spread. We can 
also examine whether there is any asymmetry in the adjustment speed of the two sides of the 
market. 
 
A widening of  the spread could be associated with an increase in uncertainty about the 
currency’s value. Thus, both the best bid and best ask depth should drop as the spread widens, 
because placing a best  limit order entails  increasing  adverse-selection risk under uncertain 
market conditions. 
 
2.2.3  The impact of past changes in depths 
Extending Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) and Engle and Patton (2004), our model enables 
us to examine how lagged best depth dynamics affect the best bid and best ask prices and depths. 
Similar to the intuition  for concurrent depths, a previous deeper market on the bid side should 
lead to upward price movement on both sides of the market. The opposite holds true for a deeper 
market on the ask side.  Further, the effect of the lagged best depth should decline over time, as 
past information is successively incorporated into prices. The model also allows us to examine 
whether the two sides of past depth have asymmetric effects on the price-discovery process. 
 
  Turning to the effect on depth equations, a deeper market on the same side of the market 
means longer queues and more competition for placing best limit orders. Consequently, traders 
should refrain from submitting best orders on the same side of the market. This is the crowding-
out effect described  in Parlour (1998). Therefore,  the best depth should drop  following a 
previous rise in depth on the same side of the market.   
 
2.2.4  The impact of past changes in depth behind the best prices  
Depths behind the best price represent the aggregation of  individuals with valuations above or 
below the current best levels, or their expectation of future price movement. As a result, behind   9 
best depth should carry  price-relevant  information.  Even though this information is not 
observable to market participants, we expect that, similar to the case of best depths, more behind 
best ask depth should lead to a downward movement in the price, and more behind best bid depth 
should lead to an  upward movement in the price. Further, we could examine whether a depth 
closer to best depth or  one  deeper down the order book has  the  strongest impact on  the 
price/depth discovery process. Since Reuters shows only the best price along with the associated 
depths (depths behind the best prices are not observable), best prices and depths would respond 
to changes in behind best depths only if individual traders have private information correlated 
with the dynamics of the depths behind the best prices. 
 
2.2.5  Time-of-day effect 
Using  time dummies, from 10:00 GMT to 16:00 GMT, allows us to compare the impact of 
activities for the rest of the trading day with the London trading hours. Bloomfield, O’Hara, and 
Saar (2005) use an experimental asset market to investigate traders’ behaviour at these times. 
They find that informed traders demand liquidity early in the trading session by submitting 
market orders, but that those traders start to supply liquidity by submitting limit orders as the day 
progresses. As a result, we expect to see an increase in the depth of best limit orders as the day 
progresses, especially at the end of the day. 
 
3.  Data 
We use the Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate from the Reuters D2000-2 system from the 
evening of 6 October 1997 to midnight on 10 October 1997. The D2000-2 is an electronic order 
book to which foreign exchange traders can submit both market and limit orders. Subscribers see 
the best bid and best ask quotes, the size supplied at these prices, and the most recent 
transactions. Although we observe all of the orders submitted to the market, traders do not 
directly observe the complete order book. For example, they cannot observe the off-best limit 
orders posted, or their cancellation.  They do, however, observe information from other sources, 
such as Reuters’ EFX page, as well as their own customer order flow.  Because there was an 
unexpected change in interest rates by the Bundesbank on 9 October 1997, and the change had 
an unusual impact on the trading activity in the foreign exchange market (see Carlson and Lo 
2004), that day is excluded from our sample.    10 
The use of the foreign exchange market has several advantages over the more commonly 
used equity data.  For example, because the market is open 24 hours a day, we can study more 
clearly how the supply and demand for a highly liquid asset develop as trading activities ebb and 
flow with the arrival and departure of traders from different geographic regions and the arrival of 
information over the day.  The impact of these changes on trading behaviour can be studied more 
clearly because this market is open with a consistent trading mechanism over the entire trading 
day.  Despite the fact that the data set has a short time span, it is the only data set available that 
has complete information on the limit order book in the foreign exchange market. The Deutsche 
Mark/U.S. dollar was the most heavily traded currency pair before the introduction of the euro, 
so t he liquidity of the market limits potential problems resulting from illiquid trading, 
information asymmetries, and other errors in the measurement of microstructure characteristics. 
Most importantly, around 85 per cent of the interdealer trade in major currencies currently goes 
through the electronic limit order book (Sager and Taylor 2005). 
 
The limit order book in the foreign exchange market therefore provides unique insight 
into the order submission strategies of dealers in a very liquid market with round-the-clock 
trading. It enables us to examine more thoroughly how the supply and demand for currencies 
over the day  influence traders’ decisions.  Further facilitating our analysis is the fact that the 
submission and cancellation of market and limit orders in the foreign exchange market provide a 
full picture of the changing state of the limit order book (there is no market-maker or features 
such as “iceberg orders”). 
 
  The data set includes the following information on each order: the price at which the 
submitter stands ready to buy or sell the currency, the quantity to be traded, the exact time it 
arrived, whether the quote is a limit order or a market order, whether the quote is bid-side or ask-
side initiated, and the entry and exit time of the quote.  The complete data set consists of 130,526 
quotes. Focusing on both order submission activities during the most active trading period—
from 7:00 to 16:00 GMT (see Figure 1)—the data set used for the empirical analysis consists of 
91,086 submitted quotes.  
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  Each trading day is divided into 5-second intervals. The changes in the best bid and best 
ask prices and their associated depths are defined as the orders submitted closest to the end of 
each interval.  For example, the change in the price of the best ask (bid) in the market is 
calculated as the difference between the quoted best ask (bid) price closest to the end of period t-
1 and the quoted best ask (bid) price closest to the end of period t.  The same is done for the 
depth at these prices.  
 
  The exogenous variables, as explained in section 2.1, are the changes in the near depth 
and the far depth on both sides of the market over the last 5-second interval.  For example, the 
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The change in the ask far depth is defined in a similar way. 
 
  Table 1 shows the overall means and standard deviations of the changes in best prices 
and their associated depths, the near depths and the far depths of both sides of the market. The 
mean changes in the prices and depths of all definitions are close to zero. Standard deviations of 
changes in depths are higher than changes in prices. Tables 2 and 3, respectively, show the 
sample means and sample standard deviation through the trading day. 
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4.  Empirical Results 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of the structural error-correction model. Each of the 
following subsections will discuss the results shown in the table. 
 
4.1  Contemporaneous relationship between the best price and its associated depth 
Rows 2 to 4 of Table 4 report the contemporaneous relationships between the current prices and 
quantities.  We find that an increase in the best ask depth leads to a significant drop in the best 
ask price. The relevant coefficient in the best ask price equation, -0.1425, is significant at the  
1 per cent significance level. This finding confirms the hypothesis that if more traders are willing 
to sell, then  the currency  is  overpriced, and  the  price decreases.  The effect, however,  
concentrates on the sell (same) side of the market. The change in the best ask depth has no 
significant effect on changes in the best bid price.  
 
An increase in the best bid depth leads to a rise in the best bid price, confirming the 
hypothesis that  if  more traders  are  willing to buy, then  the currency  is  undervalued. The 
respective coefficient in the best bid price equation is 0.0989, which is again  significant at the  
1 per cent significance level. The effect concentrates on the same side of the market—changes in 
the best bid depth do not have a significant effect on the equation for the best ask price. 
 
Turning to the depth equations, we similarly  find that the corresponding changes in the 
best depths are consistent with our hypotheses. For the best ask equation, positive changes in 
best prices are associated with a drop in the best ask depth. Thus, traders try to avoid potential 
adverse-selection risk  in case the price continues to rise:  traders do not submit new best ask 
orders and they  withdraw existing ones. The effect stems from  the bid side of the market: the 
coefficient on the best bid price  is significantly negative, with a value of  -3.4394, while the 
coefficient  for the best ask price is not significant, although  the sign is also negative, as 
hypothesized.  
 
Similar to the relationships for the best ask depth, we find that an  increase in the best 
prices on both sides of the market leads to an increase in the best bid depth. This suggests that 
buy traders are less worried about adverse-selection risk when placing a best buy limit order in a   13 
rising market. Unlike for the best ask depth, the effect of changes in the best prices comes from 
both sides of the market. The coefficients related to changes in the best ask and bid prices are 
both significantly positive and they are of similar magnitude.  
 
4.2  Error-correction impact on best prices and depths 
In Table 4, a s hypothesized,  the  best  ask price  drops  significantly  and  best  bid prices  rise 
significantly after a widening of the lag spread, returning the spread to the long-term equilibrium 
value. This finding confirms the  results  of  Engle and Patton ( 2004).  Moreover,  the two 
coefficients are of similar absolute magnitudes, which suggests that the two price series have a 
similar speed of adjustment. Therefore, the best bid price and the ask price react similarly (but in 
opposite directions) to a shock to the equilibrium spread. 
 
Extending the  results of  Engle and Patton, we find that  the changes in the spread 
significantly impact the best depths on both sides of the market. As hypothesized, a widening of 
spread leads to a negative change in both the best bid depth and the best ask depth. The intuition 
is that a wider spread represents increased uncertainty about the value of the currency. Thus, 
traders stop submitting or start withdrawing their existing best orders, to avoid being picked off 
in an uncertain market. Quite interestingly, the drop in depth across the two sides of the market 
in response to a change in spread is similar: the spread coefficients in the two depth equations are 
similar in magnitude.  This suggests that the uncertainty  created by  a widening spread has a  
similar impact on depth on both sides of the market. 
 
4.3  The impact of past changes in the best depth 
The past changes in the depth quoted at the best prices significantly impact both the best bid and 
best ask prices being submitted (Table 4).  Past increases in the best ask depth lead to significant 
decreases in the best price on both sides of the market. The coefficients are slightly larger and 
more significant on the ask side of the market. The opposite holds for past changes in the best 
bid depth—they lead to significant increases in the best prices on both sides of the market.  The 
coefficients are again slightly larger and more significant on the same side of the market. These 
findings suggest that more traders placing best ask (bid) limit orders in the past conveys negative 
(positive) aggregate information about the future value of the currency, and best prices on both   14 
sides of the market therefore drop (rise).  Moreover, the impact of concentrating on the same side 
of the market can be explained by the fact that traders tend to quote only one side of the market, 
instead of giving two sides a quote, as described in Sager and Taylor (2005).  As a result, the 
traders react more to information stemming from the same side of the market.  Another finding is 
that the magnitude of the coefficients on the lagged best depth declines over time. Except for the 
impact of the past ask depth on the best bid price, the lagged best depth coefficients uniformly 
drop in value  for the  higher autoregressive orders in both best price equations. This  finding 
confirms the hypothesis that more distant information  is less relevant for the price-discovery 
process. 
 
  For the depth equations, the effects of past depth changes on the same side of the market 
confirm the crowding-out effect suggested in Parlour (1998) and Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan 
(2005). Past positive changes in the best depth on the same side of the market lead to subsequent 
negative changes in the best depth. This holds for both the bid and the ask sides of the market. 
All coefficients on lagged changes in the best ask (bid) depth are significantly negative in the ask 
(bid) depth equation. Thus, traders appear to refrain from competing with liquidity supply on the 
same side of the market.  
 
Further, we find that best depths respond to past changes in the best depth on the opposite 
side of the market. A past positive change in the best depth on the opposite side of the market 
leads to, in general, a subsequent positive change in the best depth. This indicates that traders 
submit more best limit orders in response to past increases in liquidity supply on the opposite 
side of the market. A potential explanation is that a  deeper market at the best price on the 
opposite side of the market indicates that more traders are willing to supply liquidity at that best 
price. Thus, there is less risk on price uncertainty, and so traders place more orders on the same 
side of the market. The effect, however, is weaker than for those of the lagged, same-side depth: 
the coefficients are of much smaller absolute magnitude than those for lagged changes on the 
same-side depth, and the significance levels are much lower. This suggests that traders are more 
concerned about competition with liquidity supply from the same side of the market.  
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4.4  The impact of past changes in unobservable depths behind the best prices  
Previous changes in behind best depth, though unobservable, significantly i mpact the price-
discovery process (Table 4). Further, changes in the far depth—the depth accumulated at more 
than 3 pips from the best price—have a stronger and more significant effect than in the near 
depth—the depth accumulated between 1 to 3 pips from the best price—on the price-discovery 
process.  In both cases, a  positive previous change  in  the  behind best bid depth leads to  a 
subsequent increase in the best ask price, while a positive previous change in the behind best ask 
depth leads to a subsequent decrease in the best bid price. The intuition is that the changes in the 
depth behind the best price aggregate the changes in individuals’ valuations, or expectations, of 
future price movements. When more traders place orders deeper down (up) the order book, it 
signifies that a larger proportion of market participants have lower (higher) valuations for the 
currency, or  that  they are expecting downward ( upward) price changes. In a market with 
asymmetric information and no common knowledge, the changes in behind best depth  reveal 
price-relevant information  on the value  of the currency. In addition, the results show that, 
although traders could not observe the changes in behind best depth, they must have accessed 
information correlated with those changes (e.g., a private customer base). 
 
Turning to the depth equations, the behind best depths have a mixed effect on the current 
best depths. For the best ask depth equation, the effect of  changes in the bid near depth is 
stronger and more significantly positive than in the bid far depth. Thus, traders place more best 
ask orders in response to liquidity supply close to the best bid price. For the best bid depth 
equation, the coefficients of behind best ask depth  are smaller and less significant than their 
counterparts in the best ask depth equation.  
 
4.5  Time-of-day effect 
Confirming our hypotheses, we find that the best depth at the end of the trading day increases 
compared with the beginning of the trading day (the London trading hours). In Table 4, the time 
dummy from 15:00 GMT to 16:00 GMT, t16, is significantly positive for both the best bid depth 
equation and the best ask depth equation. Thus, this study  empirically supports  the evidence 
obtained using an experimental asset market in Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005).  
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  More interestingly,  the time-of-day  effect  influences the best prices as well. Over the 
latter part of the trading day, from 14:00 GMT to 16:00 GMT, represented by the time dummies 
t15 and t16, the best ask price increases significantly, while the best bid price drops significantly. 
The best bid price also drops significantly at the end of the London session from 10:00 GMT to 
11:00 GMT. This indicates that, at the end of the trading session, traders want to insure 
themselves against market movement during their later inactive period, and so they place orders 
at a higher ask price or lower bid price. 
 
5.  Conclusions  
We have used a structural error-correction model to examine the dynamics of best the bid price, 
best ask price, best bid depth, and best ask depth. The model includes behind best depth and time 
dummies as regressors. We find that  (i) best prices and their associated depths are 
contemporaneously related to each other; (ii) when the spread widens, the best bid price rises and 
the best ask price drops, while depth on both sides of the market drops; (iii) the lagged best depth 
has an effect on price discovery on both sides of the market, but the effect is stronger on the 
same side of the market; (iv) depths behind the best quotes move both best prices and quantities, 
even though these events are unobservable on the Reuters screen; and (v) the best depth on both 
sides of the market rises at the closing of the market. 
 
  Our empirical results have important implications for researchers who are interested in 
modelling prices and depth. First, the depths in the limit order book are determined jointly with 
prices. Both  current and lagged depth affect the price-discovery process. Models  that  ignore 
depth  lack an important piece of information. Second,  behind best quotes, especially those 
deeper down/up the order book, have a  significant impact on the price-discovery process. 
Although this fact is unobservable to traders in the FX market, it cannot be ignored in empirical 
modelling of the limit order book. Finally,  the sides of the market from which information 
arrives and at which orders are submitted are critical in understanding the evolution of the bid 
and ask prices. Thus, using midquotes, as in much of the empirical literature, may blur 
potentially important information from the two sides of the market.   17 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
This table  shows  the mean, standard deviation, median, maximum, and minimum for the 
exogenous and endogenous variables.  The data are the Deutsche Mark/U.S. dollar quotes from 
the Reuters D2000-2 electronic brokerage system for the week of 6–10 October 1997.  The data 
used are from 7:00 to 15:59 GMT.  
 
  Mean  Std  Median  Max  Min 
Change in ask price*  0.001  1.26  0  26  -19 
Change in bid price  0.001  1.21  0  18  -32 
Change in ask depth**  0.001  3.43  0  45  -39 
Change in bid depth  0.000  3.45  0  78  -82 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips from best price  -0.001  4.53  0  52  -60 
Ask depth more than 3 pips away from best price  -0.005  4.52  0  56  -56 
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips from best price  -0.001  4.08  0  48  -52 
Bid depth more than 3 pips away from best price  0.003  4.33  0  55  -56 
 
*   Prices are multiplied by 10,000. 
**  Depths are in millions.   0 
Table 2: Sample Mean of Variables through the Trading Day 
 
This table shows the sample mean of variables in the model. The trading day is divided into half-hour intervals and we consider the 
values between 7:00 and 15:59 GMT.  
 
  7:00  7:30  8:00  8:30  9:00  9:30  10:00  10:30  11:00  11:30  12:00  12:30  13:00  13:30  14:00  14:30  15:00  15:30 
 





































Change in bid price  -0.0146  0.0063  -0.0014  -0.0291  0.0097  0.0243  -0.0410  0.0104  -0.0278  0.0174  -0.0118  0.0236  0.0681  -0.0319  0.0334  -0.0076  0.0222  -0.0277 
Change in ask depth  0.0042  0.0090  -0.0090  0.0097  0.0076  -0.0146  -0.0028  -0.0028  0.0049  -0.0035  0.0055  0.0049  -0.0056  0.0035  0.0049  -0.0125  -0.0021  0.0214 
Change in bid depth  0.0049  0.0007  -0.0049  0.0097  0.0007  -0.0153  0.0035  -0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0021  0.0000  0.0076  0.0083  -0.0077  -0.0042  0.0021  -0.0062 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips  





































Ask depth more than 3 pips  
    away from best price 
 
0.0195  0.0396  0.0056  0.0354  -0.0250  -0.0097  0.0083  -0.0180  0.0250  -0.0501  0.0305  -0.0188  -0.0125  -0.0049  -0.0389  -0.0313  -0.0049  -0.0408 
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips  
    from best price  0.0021  -0.0035  0.0014  -0.0028  0.0180  -0.0146  -0.0132  0.0173  -0.0125  0.0028  -0.0076  0.0160  -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0035  -0.0090  -0.0104  -0.0007 
Bid depth more than 3 pips  




Table 3: Sample Standard Deviation of Variables through the Trading Day 
 
This table shows the sample standard deviation of variables in the model. The trading day is divided into half-hour intervals and we 
consider the values between 7:00 and 15:59 GMT.  
 
  7:00  7:30  8:00  8:30  9:00  9:30  10:00  10:30  11:00  11:30  12:00  12:30  13:00  13:30  14:00  14:30  15:00  15:30 
Change in ask price  1.19  1.22  1.11  1.01  0.75  0.81  0.97  0.99  1.14  1.11  1.29  1.19  1.18  1.16  1.52  1.94  1.69  1.73 
Change in bid price  1.27  1.30  1.09  0.84  0.83  0.90  0.85  0.99  1.00  0.94  1.19  1.63  1.47  1.08  1.56  1.49  1.63  1.13 
Change in ask depth  3.71  4.30  3.99  3.45  3.23  3.49  2.94  2.55  2.58  3.11  3.17  3.84  4.25  4.78  3.64  2.92  2.26  2.23 
Change in bid depth  3.88  3.54  4.00  4.10  3.03  3.42  3.23  2.92  2.92  2.93  3.40  3.67  4.10  4.86  3.89  3.11  2.12  1.59 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips  
    from best price  4.34  5.42  5.05  4.51  4.04  4.88  3.44  3.66  3.52  3.74  3.97  5.08  7.06  6.27  5.04  3.55  2.96  2.57 
Ask depth more than 3 pips  
    away from best price  4.33  4.71  5.44  4.72  4.11  4.74  2.91  2.80  4.05  3.75  4.17  5.25  7.85  5.69  5.11  3.16  2.92  2.15 
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips  
    from best price  4.50  4.26  5.17  4.83  3.53  3.99  3.57  3.09  4.02  3.16  5.33  4.38  4.57  4.77  4.30  3.62  2.92  1.70 
Bid depth more than 3 pips  
    away from best price  4.47  4.25  5.88  5.16  3.34  3.98  3.36  3.35  4.48  3.44  5.66  4.68  4.65  4.62  5.26  3.87  3.29  2.59 
1
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Table 4: Estimation of the Structural Error-Correction Model 
 
This table shows the results of the estimation of the simultaneous equation model (equation (1)) using the changes in best prices and 




ask price  t stat 
Change in 
bid price  t stat 
Change in 
ask depth  t stat 
Change in 
bid depth  t stat 
Intercept  0.2605  9.23  -0.2460  -10.44  0.1114  2.52  0.0909  2.06 
Change in ask price      0.6140  2.21  -0.2611  -0.70  2.3927  3.24 
Change in bid price  0.8584  2.55      -3.4394  -4.95  2.9925  5.68 
Change in ask depth  -0.1425  -6.27  0.2262  1.35      0.5910  1.27 
Change in bid depth  -0.0097  -0.12  0.0989  4.56  -0.5990  -2.18     
Spread, t-1  -0.1428  -9.66  0.1319  10.71  -0.0578  -3.81  -0.0555  -3.96 
Change in ask price t-1  -0.2076  -8.63  0.0669  4.02  0.0488  2.24  -0.0423  -1.85 
Change in ask price t-2  -0.1187  -6.29  0.0784  5.24  0.0481  2.32  -0.0710  -3.11 
Change in ask price t-3  -0.0738  -4.05  0.0555  3.78  0.0460  2.39  -0.0157  -0.69 
Change in ask price t-4  -0.0447  -2.19  0.0405  2.93  -0.0117  -0.58  -0.0442  -1.99 
Change in ask price t-5  -0.0366  -2.50  0.0244  2.15  0.0121  0.64  0.0225  1.10 
Change in bid price t-1  0.0582  3.32  -0.2014  -8.88  0.0217  0.88  -0.0232  -0.95 
Change in bid price t-2  0.0747  4.35  -0.1229  -6.05  0.0355  1.28  -0.0505  -2.37 
Change in bid price t-3  0.0510  3.02  -0.1001  -5.01  0.0454  1.80  -0.0651  -3.01 
Change in bid price t-4  0.0458  2.91  -0.0574  -3.43  0.0346  1.38  0.0265  1.35 
Change in bid price t-5  0.0138  0.95  -0.0367  -1.94  0.0311  1.35  -0.0276  -1.56 
Change in ask depth t-1  -0.0374  -13.69  -0.0220  -6.65  -0.4519  -34.85  0.0166  2.21 
Change in ask depth t-2  -0.0234  -8.59  -0.0199  -6.63  -0.3371  -27.22  -0.0018  -0.21 
Change in ask depth t-3  -0.0189  -6.86  -0.0085  -2.78  -0.2565  -20.88  0.0157  1.72 
Change in ask depth t-4  -0.0123  -4.44  -0.0131  -4.67  -0.1676  -15.76  0.0203  2.41 
Change in ask depth t-5  -0.0104  -4.14  -0.0071  -2.68  -0.1028  -10.71  0.0157  2.00 
Change in bid depth t-1  0.0252  8.67  0.0354  11.43  0.0213  2.83  -0.4633  -24.15 
Change in bid depth t-2  0.0196  6.86  0.0210  7.51  0.0068  0.92  -0.3476  -24.90 
Change in bid depth t-3  0.0135  4.66  0.0166  6.21  0.0011  0.14  -0.2660  -22.62 
Change in bid depth t-4  0.0106  3.79  0.0150  5.79  0.0149  1.97  -0.1999  -18.75 
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ask price  t stat 
Change in 
bid price  t stat 
Change in 
ask depth  t stat 
Change in 
bid depth  t stat 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-1      -0.0395  -1.61      -0.0443  -0.66 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-2      -0.0167  -1.51      -0.0013  -0.04 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-3      -0.0140  -1.34      -0.0113  -0.40 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-4      -0.0069  -1.76      0.0140  1.37 
Ask depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-5      -0.0062  -1.99      0.0193  2.30 
Ask depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-1      -0.0462  -3.59      -0.0598  -1.81 
Ask depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-2      -0.0202  -3.87      -0.0260  -1.94 
Ask depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-3      -0.0125  -3.31      -0.0003  -0.04 
Ask depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-4      -0.0105  -3.01      -0.0133  -1.53 
Ask depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-5      -0.0113  -2.63      -0.0130  -1.23 
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-1  0.0132  1.02      0.1209  2.87     
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-2  0.0006  0.09      0.0729  3.65     
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-3  0.0021  0.49      0.0385  3.37     
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-4  0.0041  1.01      0.0340  3.01     
Bid depth 1 to 3 pips from best price, t-5  0.0022  0.73      0.0239  3.08     
Bid depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-1  0.0319  4.37      0.0258  1.23     
Bid depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-2  0.0108  3.03      -0.0044  -0.52     
Bid depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-3  0.0105  3.25      -0.0063  -0.83     
Bid depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-4  0.0041  1.30      0.0149  1.73     
Bid depth more than 3 pips away from best price, t-5  0.0052  1.60      0.0185  2.16     
t11  0.0072  0.35  -0.0400  -2.03  0.0080  0.13  0.0114  0.18 
t12  0.0254  1.13  -0.0338  -1.63  0.0178  0.29  0.0118  0.19 
t13  0.0392  1.61  -0.0143  -0.53  0.0198  0.29  0.0128  0.19 
t14  0.0290  1.24  0.0168  0.68  -0.0093  -0.11  0.0276  0.34 
t15  0.0996  3.15  -0.0619  -2.09  0.0269  0.41  0.0272  0.40 
t16  0.2442  6.77  -0.2257  -6.96  0.1172  1.89  0.0947  1.72 
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This graph shows the average number of orders submitted in each half-hour interval using the 
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